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Abstract
Skilled workers emigrate from developing countries in rising numbers, raising fears of a
drain on the human and financial resources of the countries they leave. This paper
critiques existing policy proposals to address the development effects of skilled
migration. It then proposes a new kind of ex ante public-private agreement to link skill
formation and skilled migration for the mutual benefit of origin countries, destination
countries, and migrants: ‘Global Skill Partnerships’. The paper describes how such an
agreement might work in one profession (nursing) and one region (North Africa), and
offers design lessons from related initiatives around the world.
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1 Introduction
The richest countries show increasing demand for certain skilled services, and skilled
workers from around the world are migrating to provide those services. But for some
skills, particularly in health care, shortages are global—and skilled migration has the
potential to exacerbate shortages in skilled migrants’ countries of origin. Policy responses
that involve blocking skilled migration may be difficult to implement effectively or
ethically, and do little to resolve skill imbalances at the destination.
This note proposes a new kind of policy response to global skill shortages. A Global
Skill Partnership is a bilateral public-private partnership to link skill creation and skill
mobility in amutually beneficial and equitable way. Countries of migrant origin and desti-
nation agree ex ante who will bear the costs of training skilled migrants, and allow a small
portion of the large economic gains from skill mobility to foster skill creation in origin
countries. Well-designed partnerships would eliminate and even reverse fiscal drain from
origin countries due to new migration, while preserving workers’ mobility and provid-
ing needed skills at the destination. This note focuses on one profession and one region:
It offers examples of why and how a partnership for the training and mobility of nurses
might work between North Africa and Europe. But such partnerships could in principle
work in various professions and regions.
These partnerships take a dual economic opportunity and turn it into an engine of
human capital creation for both origin countries and destination countries. The first
opportunity to create value is the very large gap in the price of nursing services between
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migrant-origin countries and destination countries. Nursing services are worth 5–8 times
as much, for example, in Western Europe as in parts of North Africa. The second oppor-
tunity is that the cost of nurse training at the migrant origin is a small fraction of the cost
at the destination. It likewise costs at least 5–8 times as much to train a nurse in Western
Europe as it costs in North Africa. Skilled migration can thus create enormous economic
value. Global Skill Partnerships share that value in a way that origins, destinations, and
migrants can agree to.
This proposal begins by describing global skill imbalances in nursing and discussing
four traditional classes of policy response, each of which has important disadvantages.
It then sketches why and how a Global Skill Partnership could do better than traditional
approaches in some settings, and offers examples in the North African setting. It then
lists several design features key to the success of such partnerships, and reviews global
experience with related initiatives in the past.
2 Global skill mismatch and skilledmigration: Nurses
Workers across the world are not acquiring some of the most important skills that their
countries demand. This occurs inmany sectors, but it is clearest for certain skills in health
care. There is a global shortage of nurses, a shortage that takes one of two forms.
2.1 Two types of nursing shortage
The first form of nursing shortage is a gap between optimal staffing levels and actual
staffing levels, principally in developing countries. Many low-income countries lack the
nurses to provide basic coverage to their populations. While Western European coun-
tries typically have around 10 nurses per 1,000 population, their neighbors across the
Mediterranean have far fewer. There are 3.3 nurses per 1,000 population in Tunisia, 2.0 in
Algeria, and 0.9 in Morocco (WHO 2014). Just in these three North African countries, it
would take tens of thousands of additional nurses to universally reach basic staffing lev-
els recommended by theWorld Health Organization, and hundreds of thousands to meet
Western European staffing levels. Similarly, Verboom et al. (2006) estimate that by 2025,
India will confront a shortage of 740,000 nurses, while the shortage in sub-Saharan Africa
will be well over 1 million.
The second form of shortage is an imbalance in the labor market for health profession-
als, principally in developed countries.Many high-income countries will demand farmore
nurses than they are likely to train. Estimated Registered Nurse shortages within the next
several years include over a million in the United States (BLS 2012), 600,000 in Western
Europe (European Commission 2012), 100,000 in Canada (Little 2007), and about 100,000
in Australia (HWA 2012). All of these forecasts are sensitive to assumptions, but it is
clear that training of nurses will not rise fully to the level of demand in many advanced
economies.
Governments can respond to skill imbalances like these in many ways. Each of these
responses faces limits. In health, governments can reduce credit constraints with funding
for public training and incentives for private training of new health workers (WHO 2006).
But rich countries face funding limits as populations age—raising health service demand
while shrinking the tax base. Poor countries face even tighter constraints. Governments
can also foster international trade in health services. They can make it easier for people to
purchase health services in countries where costs are lower, known as “medical tourism”
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(Mattoo and Subramanian 2013), such as by reducing policy constraints on the portability
of health insurance (Mattoo and Rathindran 2006).
2.2 Nurse migration—and its risks
An alternative response—fostering migration by skilled workers—is very likely to play a
role in reducing some of these imbalances. Employment-based migration is controversial
everywhere; but in health, it is already happening. Large fractions of the health workforce
in some countries got their training in other countries. In the United States, 7% of reg-
istered nurses (Auerbach et al. 2012) and 25% of physicians (AMA 2010) were trained
abroad. Governments from Germany to Japan have tested programs to attract health
workers from abroad.
Health worker migration has raised important concerns about its potential effects on
the countries of origin. A central concern is that the movement of health workers from
less-developed countries will deplete the human resource base of already-weak health
systems (WHO 2006). These concerns are so acute that the term “brain drain” is often
used as a synonym for skilled migration, with health worker migration seen as its worst
face (Grignon et al. 2012). Destination countries that allow migration have been accused
of causing deaths in migrant origin countries by failing to limit these “fatal flows” (Joint
Learning Initiative 2004, p. 102).
A separate concern is that health worker migration can deplete public coffers in the
countries that migrants leave. Even when those countries are able to train replacements
for those whomigrate, this training often occurs at public expense. One country’s taxpay-
ers can, in effect, end up subsidizing other countries’ health systems (WHO 2011). This
can be globally inefficient, because it encourages migrant destination countries to ‘free
ride’ on the training resources of origin countries—possibly leading to socially inefficient
underprovision of training. When the destination country is much wealthier than the ori-
gin country, this also raises concerns about justice. It is estimated that tens of thousands
of dollars in public subsidies are lost each time a Registered Nurse emigrates from Kenya
(Kirigia et al. 2006) orMalawi (Muula et al. 2006). Mills et al. (2011) estimate a cumulative
total training cost of US$2.2 billion for African-trained physicians residing in Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
All of this has led to something of an impasse: In nursing, rich countries face pres-
sure to raise skilled migration in response to local shortages and demographic forces. But
they simultaneously face pressure to limit skilled migration in response to concerns about
development impacts overseas. The next section describes four existing classes of propos-
als to address this impasse—and their drawbacks. Thereafter the paper proposes a new
approach.
3 Four existing approaches to limit the development impact of nurse
migration
Broadly speaking, policymakers have four existing options to limit the development
impacts of skilled migration. This section reviews those options for the case of nurse
migration—and their drawbacks. Thereafter, the paper will propose a new, fifth option.
3.1 Limit migration?
The first class of policies seeks to limit the ability of skilled workers to choose migra-
tion. This can involve preventing destination-country recognition of migrants’ skills
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(Gish and Godfrey, 1979), ‘self-sufficiency’ policies at destination countries to prevent
migrants from working there (e.g. WHO 2011, [Article 5.4]), and treating international
recruiters of skilled workers as unethical or even criminal (Mills et al. 2008).
All proposals to obstruct migration on development grounds face important obsta-
cles. First, it is unclear how effective these policies are in limiting skilled migration.
Second, even successfully blocking skilled migration may not address skill shortages. If
migrant-destination countries could somehow force return migration by half of all expa-
triate African doctors and nurses, this would only eliminate 6% of Africa’s shortage of
doctors and nurses, as estimated by the World Health Organization (OECD 2007, p.
178). Third, proposals to obstruct skilled migration are ethically and legally complex.
Article 13.2 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth the
unqualified right to leave any country. This right could be undermined by bans on “active
recruitment”, because skilledworkers’ professions are often only basis for them to lawfully
migrate. (If firms’ “active recruitment” of women were banned, would this not under-
mine women’s unconditional right to work?) Fourth, restricting individual choice can have
important efficiency effects. An Ethiopian doctor’s best contribution to medical science,
for example, might only be possible with the resources available to her abroad.
3.2 Compensation payments after migration?
Another way for governments to offset fiscal losses associated with skilled emigration is
to demand cash compensation for costs incurred through subsidies to migrants’ training
(e.g. Agwu and Llewelyn 2009; Chen et al. 2011;Mills et al. 2013). These might come from
destination-country governments or from migrants themselves.
Such policies also face important difficulties. The financial loss is difficult to calculate
given that many skilled workers provide substantial service prior to migration. African-
trained physicians in the United States and Canada typically practiced in their home
country for over seven years, on average, before departure (Clemens 2011). It is unclear
that the cost of basic education should be included, as Mills et al. (2011) suggest it should
be, since most origin countries consider basic education a right that is not contingent on
subsequent movement. Destination countries’ priorities for human capital subsidies in
origin countries might differ from origin countries’ own priorities, making compensation
payments politically vulnerable (Clemens 2009). And aid flows are substantially fungi-
ble (e.g. Pack and Pack 2009), so even aid earmarked for human capital creation may not
cause more human capital to be created.
3.3 Domestic efficiency measures?
Another way for policymakers to counteract the effects of skilled migration at the origin
is to make the most of the human resources they are left with. For example, the effect of
a health worker’s departure on local health conditions can be mitigated by increasing the
effectiveness of remaining health workers.
In developed countries, many rural areas use efficiecny measures to adapt to out-
migration. For example, many US states with shortages of highly trained health workers
have adopted laws empowering qualified by lower-level health workers to do more for
patients1. In low-income countries, there are likewise many ways to improve the effec-
tiveness of skilled workers who choose not to migrate. In the health sector this can
imply meaningful incentives to provide primary care in slums and rural areas; focusing
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training efforts on prevention and basic primary care rather than higher-level tertiary
care; giving providers the medicines and tools they need to practice effectively; and
dismantling domestic barriers to independent practice by well-trained nurses. Clemens
(2009) explores these measures.
3.4 Oblige return migration?
An alternative approach is to allow skilled workers to migrate for limited periods, then
require them to return home. Many policy approaches to skilled migration contain such
requirements. Many countries have training programs of one sort or another that oblige
skilled migrants to return to their home countries after a limited period. Brazil and
Turkey, among others, have mechanisms to pay for their nationals’ graduate education
overseas in exchange for a commitment of service in the home country2. Each requires
that migrants return home for a few years.
Return-migration programs face important limitations. In projects to encourage return
among skilled expatriates, only small fractions of migrants take up the offer McCabe et al.
(2009). Return migration of skilled workers has happened at scale primarily when the
country of origin creates the incentive for return—as occurred in Taiwan (Chang 1992;
Saxenian 2002). Moreover, skill shortages in many destination countries are long-term.
The demographic transition will not soon reverse course in Germany and Japan; nurses
will be needed there and elsewhere for the foreseeable future. Permanent migration best
serves long-term needs.
4 A new approach: linking skill creation to skill mobility
Policymakers have a fifth, barely-explored option to address the development effects of
skilled migration while preserving its global benefits. Countries of origin and destination
can enter a new kind of bilateral agreement, a Global Skill Partnership. Two governments
in a Global Skill Partnership agree ex ante on how to share the costs and benefits of cre-
ating skills for both countries’ needs, while preserving workers’ freedom of movement.
These partnerships could occur in any technical field that is in global demand, but this
section focuses on their application to nursing.
4.1 Key elements of a Global Skill Partnership
The heart of a Global Skill Partnership is a pre-migration agreement between two coun-
tries. The governments and any private-sector partners agree on who at the destination
will help finance migrants’ training, what portion of training will occur at the origin and
to what standard, who will offer employment at the destination under what conditions,
and how the benefits of skilled migration will support training for non-migrants. The
agreement shapes the financing for training skilled migrants in such a way that it creates,
rather than depletes, human capital in the origin country. At the same time it meets the
needs of the destination country while opening opportunities for migrants.
One form of Global Skill Partnership could be a two-track technical school for nurses.
Such a school would be a technical training institute in a developing country, where each
student at entry must choose one of two tracks or courses of study. An ‘away’ track would
train students to work abroad, in a developed country—permanently or temporarily. A
‘home’ track would train students to work in related jobs inside the country of training.
Training for ‘away’ students could be financed either by destination-country employers
Clemens IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:2 Page 6 of 18
or governments, or by graduates’ future earnings through a form of migration-contingent
student loan. This financing would contain a partial subsidy to the training of ‘home’ track
students—a social training credit—fostering and financing a supply response to nurse
mobility.
Such a partnership could take many forms, according to the division of rights and
responsibilities between the partners. Training could occur entirely in the origin coun-
try, or could begin at the origin and conclude at the destination. Financing could occur
through the destination-country government, destination-country firms, through the stu-
dents themselves, or somemix of these. Support for origin-country training could be large
or limited.
4.2 Two engines of human capital creation
A Global Skill Partnership creates a financial mechanism to realize and share the benefits
of two large arbitrage opportunities—turning them into engines of skill creation at the
origin and the destination. These opportunities are illustrated here for nurses who move
from North Africa to Europe, but similar opportunities exist all over the world.
The first opportunity is that the market value of nursing services is several times higher
in Europe than in much of North Africa. Monthly wages of professional nurses com-
monly fall in the range US$400–500 in Morocco (Lebsir 2009) and Tunisia (Lautier 2005,
p. 47)3. Foreign-trained nurses can start at US$2,500–3,000 per month and soon progress
to $4,000 in Germany and France4. This means that the mobility of nursing services from
North Africa to Europe creates enormous economic value, like all movements of goods
and services across an arbitrage opportunity. In the absence of some form of Global Skill
Partnership, this value accrues to migrants and destination countries.
The second opportunity is that the cost of nurse training in North Africa is a small frac-
tion of the cost in Europe. A full three-year course of training in professional nursing can
be had in the largest urban centers of Morocco and Tunisia for less than US$14,000 total.
In smaller cities the cost can be considerably less5. The full cost of training a professional
nurse in Germany or the United Kingdom falls in the range is US$80,000–US$100,000
total, or more, without living expenses6. This likewise means that the mobility of nurse
training from Europe to North Africa can create enormous economic value. And again, in
the absence of a bilateral agreement, this value accrues tomigrants’ destination countries.
These numbers imply that training at the origin followed by service at the destina-
tion creates tremendous economic value. Three years of training a single nurse in North
Africa followed by five years of service in Western Europe can create on the order
of US$70,000–80,000 or more through the training cost differential and an additional
US$120,000–150,000 or more through the wage differential. This means that the total
added value of the arrangement would exceed US$200,000 even if the final year of training
occurred in the destination country.
AGlobal Skill Partnership ensures that this added value is shared in a way that all parties
can agree to. Without any agreement, value accrues exclusively to migrants and destina-
tion countries, and is widely seen as inequitable. In a partnership, origins and destinations
agree ex ante that a small portion of the added value be directed toward nurse training
at the origin—both for the migrants and to some degree for non-migrants. This lets the
dual arbitrage opportunity play its role as an engine of human capital creation for the
destination country while playing the same role at the origin.
Clemens IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:2 Page 7 of 18
4.3 Examples in a North African context
Here are schematic examples of how a two-track technical school might work in Tunisia,
to prepare nurses wishing to work in Germany:
Maryam and Youssef are two young, low-income Tunisians interested in training to
work as nurses. Maryam wants to work in Germany, Youssef in Tunisia. The federal
government of Germany finances an intensive German language course for Maryam,
after which the state government of Bavaria pays for one year of Maryam’s technical
coursework in nursing (partly in German) as well as one year of Youssef ’s coursework
(in French or Arabic). All of this training occurs in Tunis. After this, Maryam moves to
Bavaria to begin a two-year apprenticeship with a hospital, while Youssef completes his
training in Tunis and works there. As in a standard German apprenticeship, Maryam’s
training is financed jointly by the employer and the state. The Bavarian government
saves money from the much lower cost of conducting Maryam’s coursework in Tunis
relative to a standard apprenticeship. A small portion of that savings goes to subsidize
Youssef ’s training.
In an alternative structure, the schools could be self-financing:
Maryam and Youssef train as nurses entirely in Tunis. Maryam plans to work in
Germany, Youssef in Tunis. Training each of them costs US$10,000, and neither can
afford it. A private hospital group in Germany finances all of Maryam’s training and
half of Youssef ’s, for a total of US$15,000. In return, Maryam commits herself to work
within its hospital network for at least four years. With just 12% of Maryam’s earnings
over that period, she pays back the entire US$15,000. Alternatively, Maryam could ‘buy
out’ her commitment to the original hospital group by switching employers and paying
cash to offset her training costs.
And in another structure, training could be split between the two countries:
Maryam plans to work in Germany, Youssef in Tunis. Both train as nurses for one
year in Tunis, while Maryam takes intensive German language classes that Youssef
does not. The two then separate: Maryam completes two additional years of training in
Germany, Youssef completes his training in Tunis. The German employer and public save
US$25,000 or more from covering the cost of Maryam’s first year in Tunis rather than in
Germany, as they would normally have to, even including the cost of Maryam’s German-
language training. They thus agree to share the savings with Tunisia—providing a
US$5,000 subsidy to cover half the cost of Youssef ’s full course of study in Tunis. From the
standpoint of the German employer, Maryam is a normal trainee but for the attraction
of her reduced training cost, and there is little doubt of her skill level since her training
has mostly occurred at and has been completed at German institutions7.
These examples are merely illustrative and many details could change. But observe
the consequences of any of the above arrangements (Table 1): Germany gains a nurse
(Maryam) whose net earnings are still eight times what she could earn in Tunisia; the
German employer saves money, ending up with less net expenditure on training than in
an normal apprenticeship and gains a profitable employee; Tunisia gains a nurse (Youssef )
with a sizeable free scholarship; two low-income Tunisians get professional careers that
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Table 1 How aGlobal Skill Partnership beats the status quo in skilledmigration
Actor Benefit
Destination country – Workers for shortage occupations
– Lower public training expenses
Destination employer – Custom-trained workers
– Reduced training expenses
– Recruitment facilitated at origin
Migrants – Professional employment
– International-quality training
– Access for students from low-income backgrounds
– Large rise in earnings
Origin country – Subsidized training for ‘home’ track professionals
– Greater supply of professionals at origin
– No fiscal drain from graduates’ migration
– Stronger in-country training institutions
– Technology transfer for customized training
– Remittances from ‘away’ track graduates
are otherwise inaccessible; Tunisia expands the capacity and quality of its nurse training
facilities; and there is no cost at all to the German or Tunisian governments. Other ben-
efits to Tunisia could arise if Maryam chooses to remit some of her earnings home, or
return one day to work in Tunisia.
And the framework could be flexibly adapted to different settings: First, two-track
schools schools could include nursing assistants and personal care workers, in addition
to or instead of full professional nurses. Second, they could begin with health profes-
sionals, but the same framework could later be applied to various types of training to fill
semi-skilled and skilled labor shortages in Europe. Third, the arrangement for graduates
to live and work in Europe could be temporary or permanent, according to the needs of
the destination country or even decided on an individual basis.
Note that an arrangement of this kind would be less expensive to destination country
consumers and taxpayers than other ways of supplying their demand for nurses. Very
large rises in pay for nurses might induce more natives of destination countries to become
nurses. But they would be trained at destination-country cost—a cost borne sooner or
later by patients or taxpayers. And even substantial increases in the nursing wage bill
are unlikely to induce nursing labor supply that will match demand in some destination
countries (Buerhaus et al. 2009; Spetz and Given 2003).
4.4 The two-track system
The all-around benefits in Table 1 are possible simply because the labor of a nurse is
worth enormously more money in Germany than in Tunisia, and the cost of training a
nurse is enormously lower in Tunisia than in Germany. A two-track school can turn these
price differences into an engine of human capital creation on both sides of the Mediter-
ranean. And two-track training requires little or no up-front cost to students and is thus
accessible to students of any income level. Training for migrants costs origin-country tax-
payers nothing and subsidizes the creation of professionals in the home country through
the ‘home’ track, reducing fears of ‘brain drain’. Graduates who do not migrate pay much
lower tuition, heavily subsidized by a small portion of migrant graduates’ earnings. The
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essence of the financing mechanism resembles a new type of student loan—tailored to
the international context, and contingent upon the ability to pay that arises through
migration.
Why would students choose the domestic track? Large numbers of skilled workers (and
health workers in particular) from developing countries simply do not wish to emigrate—
for a range of personal and professional reasons. Earnings are far from the only factor in
health workers’ migration decisions (e.g. George et al. 2013). In the Philippines, where
overseas opportunities for nurses are widely available, so many nurses choose to stay and
work in their home country that the Philippines has high nurse staffing ratios—more, per
capita, than Great Britain and Austria (Clemens 2009).
Even from very low-income countries, many health professionals do not wish to
migrate. Awases et al. (2004) survey 2,382 nurses, doctors, and pharmacists in Cameroon,
Ghana, Senegal, SouthAfrica, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. They find that 51% of respondents
have no intention of emigrating. Avato (2009, Figure two) reports survey results on 3,834
workers in Tunisia, Egypt, Moldova, and Albania, from numerous professions. Among
tertiary-educated workers, about one third of Tunisians and Egyptians have no intention
of emigrating, as well as about two fifths of Albanians and two thirds of Moldovans. Large
numbers of skilled workers in general, and health workers in particular, are interested in
training to work in their countries of origin. Furthermore, developing countries partici-
pating in arrangements of this kind could cap enrollment in the ‘away’ track at any level
desired.
5 Key design elements and lessons from related initiatives
Many governments and firms have created programs that somehow link training to skilled
migration. Each of these programs differs substantially from a Global Skill Partnership,
but offers lessons on their proper design. Some of these experiences demonstrate that a
key element of a Global Skill Partnership is possible, while others suggest possible pitfalls.
5.1 Financingmechanism
In a Global Skill Partnership, training finance is provided before migration and recouped
after migration. The parties to the agreement are separated by both distance and time.
Such a financing scheme requires contracts spelling out the obligations of each party,
reliable payment systems, secure records, and a mutually-agreed division of the financial
burden of training subsidies, among other elements.
Many private-sector programs have created mechanisms for overseas employers to
finance pre-migration skill acquisition for new hires. Shipping companies help finance
pre-departure technical training for migrant seafarers at several centers in migrants’
home countries. These include the Mapúa-PTC College of Maritime Education and
Training in the Philippines, and the Kiribati Marine Training Center in Kiribati.
Construction firms in Singapore finance pre-migration technical training for migrant
laborers through training centers operated by Virsagi Management in Bangladesh and
India.
Related private-sector mechanisms have been created for nursing as well. Nurses Now
International (NNI) was aMexican firm financing training inMexico for nurses to work in
theUnited States, operating from 2008 to 2012. NNI selectedMexicans with basic nursing
training and provided six months of intensive training in advanced nursing methods and
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English language, financing the cost of training and a stipend. Graduates were then placed
at partner hospitals in the US for two months of additional training followed by three or
four years of nursing work, using skilled work visas created by NAFTA. This migration
typically raised their earning potential by roughly 1,000%—from about US$400/month
in Mexico to US$4,500/month in the US—and 5–10% of those earnings were used to
pay back the cost of their training (Oviedo 2009). The financing mechanism appears to
have worked well for individual graduates. But the company began operations just as the
Great Recession struck the United States, limiting demand for graduates and eventually
causing investors to pull out (Squires and Beltrán-Sánchez 2013, pp. 30–35). NNI received
certification from the Alliance for Ethical International Recruitment Practices.
Other, related initiatives receive some type of public facilitation. In Germany at the time
of this writing, a suite of agreements is being piloted by the German Society for Inter-
national Cooperation (GIZ) together with employers in eldercare and nursing. In one of
these, employers are working with GIZ and the German Ministry for Economic Affairs
to finance pre-migration German-language training and nursing skills training for 100
Vietnamese young people in Vietnam, followed by an abbreviated two-year apprentice-
ship in geriatric nursing in Germany. By allowing Vietnam-acquired nurse training to
substitute for the first year of the German apprenticeship, this program represents an
innovative internationalization of the apprenticeship model. Like most German appren-
ticeships, it is jointly financed by employers and the government.
Issues in the financing mechanism appear to have arisen in another innovative initiative
of this type. German private hospital group Asklepios recently worked with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to create a nurse migration partnership with Tunisia called the TaPIG
Project. Groups of Tunisian students arrived in Hamburg in late 2012 and early 2013 for
sixmonths of German language and culture training (paid by the ForeignAffairsMinistry)
to be followed by three years of apprenticeship training in nursing, paid by Asklepios. The
financing mechanism involved an additional component of a student loan to cover other
expenses of the students, such as room and board during the language and culture train-
ing. Complications with those loans appear to have led to suspension of new entries in the
the TaPIG Project at the time of this writing (though Asklepios intends to continue the
training of previous entrants). The TaPIG experience suggests that the precise financing
mechanism may be critical to progress in arrangements of this genre.
5.2 Training customization and quality control
Global Skill Partnerships require ways for destination-country employers to work with
origin-country training centers to ensure that students receive high-quality training in
the areas that employers need. This will help ensure graduates’ successful placement,
as well as exerting upward pressure on training quality at the training institute more
generally—including in the ‘home’ track. A great deal of infrastructure already exists.
All major migrant-destination countries have systems for testing foreign-trained health
professionals’ skills, such as the National Council Licensure Examination (NCLEX) in the
United States and the Overseas Nurses Program in the United Kingdom. US studies of
foreign-trained nurses (Cortés and Pan 2012) and doctors (Norcini et al. 2010) find them
to be of comparable quality to their US-trained counterparts. The aforementioned project
of GIZ is testing mechanisms to ensure the quality and relevance of training acquired in
Vietnam.
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In another German pilot called the “Triple-Win Project”, GIZ helps employers recruit
qualified health workers from Serbia, Bosnia, the Philippines, and Tunisia. In this project,
GIZ helps arrange professional training, language training, and integration assistance
in the country of origin—before migration—which is fully financed by the workers’
future employers in Germany. Beyond these, Germany is also the setting for multiple
initiatives of this kind in the private health sector. The Arbeitgeberverband-Pflege—
a private nursing home network—is supporting the training of eldercare workers in
China for both German language and technical training. These initiatives show that it
is at least possible to set up training facilities of international quality in developing-
country settings, though the potential to expand such training to larger scale remains
unproven.
In another example from Finland, the surgical wards of Helskinki University Central
Hospital have recruited nurses from the Philippines in a way that divides their training
between the two countries (Wildau 2011). Entrants to the program already have nursing
degrees from the Philippines, and must complete one year of additional training at the
Laurea University of Applied Sciences while undergoing intensive Finnish language train-
ing. Because the Laurea program normally lasts three and a half years for Finnish entrants,
training from the Philippines substitutes for two and a half years of Finland-based train-
ing. The end result is that, in effect, these nurses’ training is taking place partly in the
Philippines and partly in Finland. The private Finnish firm Attendo has likewise recruited
Filipinos already qualified as nurses to undergo language training and additional voca-
tional training in Helsinki, financed in part by the Trade Union for the Public andWelfare
Sectors, JHL (Jokinen 2013). Here, again, the recruits’ preparation as nurses is in effect
split between the Philippines and Finland.
The importance of quality control is highlighted by the Kiribati Australia Nursing
Initiative (KANI). In 2006, Australia created KANI to train i-Kiribati students as nurses
in Australia and for service in Australia. To date, scores of students have been trained to
date at GriffithUniversity in Australia. The program is not broadly perceived as promising
and appears unlikely to continue. Many graduates have had difficulty in passing licen-
sure examinations and securing professional employment in Australia, despite nursing
shortages there. Officials familiar with KANI suggest in personal communications that
the project could have benefited from more stringent up-front selection of students. But
I am not aware of a publicly-available independent evaluation that would clarify KANI’s
lessons.
5.3 Contingency plan
There will certainly be students in the ‘away’ track who cannot or will not migrate, just as
there may be students in the ‘home’ track that attempt to migrate. A successful two-track
school will require a plan for how to address these scenarios. Training credits to ‘away’
track students who do not migrate might be fully or partially forgiven, with allowances
made for these eventualities in the financial plan. Migration among ‘home’ track students
may be limited if their training does not include extensive foreign-language preparation
and placement assistance.
Employers and financiers involved in any such partnerships would need assessments of
the risks involved and provisions for unintended outcomes. Two of the German initiatives
described above—the TaPIG Project and the Arbeitgeberverband-Pflege partnership—
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built into their initial designs a provision for trainees who are either unable to migrate,
unable to remain, or unable to complete satisfactory work.
The need for these plans was illustrated by a nurse training program negotiated between
Canada and Jamaica. In late 2009, the Canadian and Jamaican governments created a pro-
gram to train Licensed Practical Nurses in Jamaica for service in Alberta, Canada. The
course of study was 18 months. Training was conducted at the Pre-University School
in Kingston, Montego Bay, and Portmore, and was accredited by NorQuest College in
Alberta. It was created by an agreement between the Canadian High Commission and the
JamaicanMinistry of Labor, brokered by the private firmMarmicmon IntegratedMarket-
ing and Communications. Students covered the cost of training and recruitment with the
expectation of high earnings in Canada.
The Canada-Jamaica program was discontinued in late 2011. There is no publicly-
available independent evaluation of the causes of this closure. Reid (2012) reports that
of the 156 students who had completed training by May 2011, only 30 had departed for
Canada. NorQuest canceled its contract with the Pre-University School in 2011. Even stu-
dents who did not migrate were required to pay up front J$270,000 tuition, C$1,500 to
Marmicmon and C$300 to NorQuest. A central problem was that many of the students
were unable to complete practical portions of their training in Jamaica—required for
licensing in Canada—because the Pre-University School had accepted students unable to
enter practical training for technical reasons (Reid 2011). There also appear to have been
unexpected delays in placing even fully qualified graduates with employers in Canada, dis-
agreements over cost sharing between Canadian and Jamaican partner institutions, and a
lack of employer participation in training finance to diminish students’ risk exposure.
5.4 Skill recognition and employer leadership
AGlobal Skill Partnership cannot function as intended unless it creates skills that employ-
ers proactively demand—in both countries—and provides mechanisms for the mutual
recognition of those skills. Employers must be directly involved from the beginning, for
few other actors are likely to push sufficiently hard against political and administrative
barriers against labor mobility. This is suggested by a related initiative in the Pacific
Region that has resulted in little labor mobility.
The Australia Pacific Technical College (APTC) is a network of five technical train-
ing campuses in the developing Pacific Island states of Vanuatu, Samoa, Fiji, Papua New
Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. It was created in 2007 to offer Australia-recognized
training qualifications for electricians, chefs, hospitality workers, and other skilled trades-
persons. It was designed and subsidized by Australian aid to serve two goals: to build up
human capital on the islands, and to provide skilled workers for shortage occupations in
Australia. In this role it internationalizes skill creation. The second of these goals has been
largely discarded as the APTC evolved. Just 1.2% of the APTC’s roughly 5,000 graduates
have moved to Australia or New Zealand since the College was created.
Clemens et al. (2014) explore the reasons for this shift away from international mobility
for skilled graduates. Some of these are: 1) Beyond their Australia-recognized diploma,
graduates also need Australian recognition of work experience to qualify for most
temporary and settler visas. The process for this recognition is difficult and expensive
and the APTC has no involvement. 2) The APTC was largely the personal initiative of
one Prime Minister, and it received substantially less support when he left office shortly
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after it was created. It was not created at the insistent demand of other Australian interest
groups, especially employers. 3) The curriculum was not built around occupations with
critical shortages.
5.5 Destination-country labor involvement
It is critical to design programs of this kind in cooperation with labor unions or employ-
ees’ associations at the destination. In the nursing and personal care sector, for example,
workers’ associations at the destination are likely to express a legitimate interest in the
effects of foreign trainees on their own working conditions and negotiating power. The
possibility of conflict might be reduced by focusing training on shortage occupations, but
is unlikely to be eliminated.
An example comes from East Asia, where in 2008 Japan began a program to attract
nursing trainees from Indonesia and the Philippines under Economic Partnership Agree-
ments or EPAs (Ogawa 2012; Ohno 2012). These programs attract entrants who already
have training and experience as nurses or care workers, and the program does not include
a component to finance that origin-country training. But the Japanese government does
pay for recruitment, travel, and living expenses of participants, while employers pay for six
months of Japanese language training. Once arrived in Japan, program entrants become
nursing and certified care-worker “candidates”, working legally without a license until
they pass a stringent licensure examination of technical skills and Japanese language
ability.
This program has faced difficulties because most entrants have failed the licensure
exam. A total of 1,360 candidates entered Japan during 2008–2011. Of the first migrants
who took the exam in 2010, just 1.2% passed. In 2011, 4.0% passed. This licensure exam
was instated at the request of the Japan Nursing Association out of concern for “the poten-
tial effects on the domestic labor market” (Ogawa 2012) and it has been alleged that the
Association designed the exam to keep the passing rate low as a protectionist measure
(Ohno 2012, p. 550). Inoue (2013) concludes,
“The low ratio of success is the result of conflicting policy interests in a single politi-
cal arrangement. At the administrative level, the MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
and the MHLW [Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare] take . . . different positions to
the EPA. The MOFA thinks that the EPA contributes to the international exchange of
persons and inviting highly skilled persons. However, the MHLW emphasized that the
EPA was not regarded as the solution for local staff shortage. Such MHLW’s position
was parallel to that of the Japanese Nursing Association (JNA), one of the occupational
interest group in the healthcare sector. The JNA places a special emphasis on protecting
the national labour market . . . ”
This experience highlights the importance of close coordination with destination-
country labor organizations to prevent political conflict from damaging the program.
Programs of this kind are likely to be perceived as a threat and substantial involvement of
labor organizations will be required to build trust. Ogawa (2012) predicts that “if Japan
continues to enforce the condition for the foreign workers to pass the national exam
. . . the care facilities may eventually stop accepting them because of the large financial and
human cost incurred.”
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5.6 Other key elements
Additional design elements likely to influence the success of a Global Skill Partnership
include:
Bilateral agreement. Themovement of skilled workers, particularly health workers, has
often occurred in an atmosphere of mistrust and contestation among policymakers. Poli-
cymakers at the origin are unlikely to cooperate unless they believe that it is truly designed
to foster human capital formation for domestic service. Policymakers at the destination
are unlikely to cooperate if they perceive their origin-country counterparts as a potential
obstacle. A Bilateral Labor Agreement can make expectations clear without the need for
a binding treaty: Sáez (2013) reviews several examples.
Integrity of the ‘home’ track. Students in the ‘home’ track of a two-track school would
be unlikely to migrate if the program were carefully designed. Graduates of any such
program are unlikely to successfully migrate if their skills are not custom-designed for
accreditation at the destination, if they receive no specialized language training, and if
their work visas are not facilitated in the context of a bilateral agreement.
Social training credit. Parties would need to agree up front to what degree the value
generated by migrants in the ‘away’ track would subsidize the training of non-migrants in
the ‘home’ track.
Language training. Many types of skilled work, certainly including all nursing and per-
sonal care work, require excellent skills in the language of the destination country. This
must be a major focus of training in the ‘away’ track. Several of the initiatives discussed
above, including the work of GIZ and NNI, show that it is quite possible for trainees to
acquire sufficient language skills.
Interministerial coordination. A two-track school arrangement for health workers
would likely require cooperation or at least assent from numerous ministries in order
to function properly. These might include ministries of health, development aid, labor,
immigration, and foreign affairs, and possibly ministries of education and planning. For
example, cooperation between the aid and immigration agencies of the Australian govern-
ment might have helped ensure that more substantial numbers of APTC trainees could
access the Australian labor market.
Portability between employers. Employers that participate in financing training in the
‘away’ track deserve a return on that investment. But there are dangers in tying employees
exclusively to a single employer formany years, since an important protection for workers’
rights is their ability to leave a job. A successful arrangement should allow for graduates
to have the option to ‘buy out’ their commitment to an employer by working for a second
employer and paying making pre-set cash payments to the first.
6 Conclusion
More andmore skilled workerswillmove from poor to rich countries in the years to come.
There is little question that large-scale movement will happen; the question is on what
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terms it will happen. Skilled people will move, particularly nurses, but there need not be a
choice between allowing that movement and stopping fiscal drain at the origin. This note
proposes a new form of public-private training partnership to help skilled migration hap-
pen on terms more beneficial for origin countries, destination countries, and migrants:
Global Skill Partnerships.
The two-track technical school is one form of Global Skill Partnership that maxi-
mizes the benefits to everyone involved. Designed correctly, a two-track school can
provide destination countries with the skilled workers they will need and good jobs for
youths from developing countries, while at the same time helping strengthen human cap-
ital stocks and public coffers in migrants’ countries of origin. Innovative partnerships
like these are better ways to address concerns about skilled migration than alterna-
tive policies such as enforcing limits on migration or post-migration compensation
payments. Those policies have attempted to reconstruct a world without migration.
Global Skill Partnerships, in contrast, are a tool to help policymakers plan for a mobile
world.
Endnotes
1Rural US patients depend more on Nurse Practitioners than urban patients for
primary care (Everett et al. 2009) and prescriptions (Cipher et al. 2006). This may
contribute to the fact that many rural US states with shortages of physicians allow nurse
practitioners to make diagnoses or prescribe medicine without physician supervision
(such as North Dakota, Wyoming, Idaho, Iowa, and West Virginia), while all the states
with the largest cities do not allow this (New York, California, Texas, Illinois). This does
not demonstrate that these regulatory differences were caused by physicians’ migration
patterns, but the existence of greater freedoms for Nurse Practitioners in rural areas
does help to accommodate physicians’ choices about where to live, helping rural states
to get the most out of health professionals who are less likely to leave.
2Brazil does this through its National Council for Scientific and Technological
Development (CNPq), and Turkey through its Scientific and Technological Research
Council (TÜBI˙TAK).
3Converted using exchange rates current at the time of each source’s publication.
4German Medicine Net SARL (http://www.germanmedicine.net/en/jobsnurses.
html) advertised on April 5, 2014 “nursing jobs in hospitals in all parts of Germany” for
foreign-trained nurses, paying “ca. 1800–3000 Euros before taxes and social
security/month depending on qualification and region, up to 3500 Euros/month with
additional qualifications.” In 2012–13 the German Federal Employment Agency (http://
www.manila.diplo.de/contentblob/3924096/Daten/3341372/RSF_fil_nurses_to_
Germany.pdf) offered starting salaries in the same range to Filipino nurses through the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (FM-POEA-04-EF-07-A). In France,
the Syndicat National des Professionels Infirmiers (http://www.syndicat-infirmier.com/
IMG/pdf/606_27_grille_IDE.pdf) reports a similar range for starting and early-career
wages in France.
5The private École Supérieure Privé de Nutrition et du Paramédical in Casablanca
(http://www.supsante.ma/formulaireincsription.html) currently charges MAD37,000
per year, plus a one-time MAD3,500 registration fee, for its three-year sciences
infirmières course—for a total three-year cost under US$14,000. The private Institut
Supérieur Privé des Sciences Infirmières de Sousse (ISEPSI) in Sousse, Tunisia (http://
www.etoile-formation.com/homepage_isepsi.html) currently charges TND2,500 or less
for each year of its three-year professional nursing course, including registration fee,
amounting to a total start-to-finish cost under US$5,000.
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6The University of Witten/Herdecke, a private university in Germany accredited as an
Universität equivalent in quality to state-run universities, (http://sg.blog.uni-wh.de/
generationenvertrag/beitragssatze/) charges¤12,600 per semester for its three-year
Bachelors in Nursing Practice, for a total cost of¤75,600. The King’s College London
Florence Nightengale School of Nursing and Midwifery (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/ug/
funding/fees/overseas.aspx) currently charges £15,450 per year in tuition only to
non-European foreign students for its three-year Bachelors in nursing, or (inclusive of
fees) about US$80,000 total. These figures do not include any living expenses.
7Germany is currently piloting a partnership for geriatric nurses from Vietnam that
resembles this arrangement in most aspects except the absence of a ‘home’ track or
Social Training Credit. This is discussed below.
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